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“For truth, which is what the gospel of justification of the ungodly is about,  
shatters not a few of what were to us till now self-evident beliefs.  
But it does this only to generate new self-evident beliefs: 
 ones which can stand before God.”  1
Abstract: With particular attention to Sickness Unto Death, this essay explores the 
place and function of the coram deo motif in Kierkegaard’s theological programme, 
arguing that it serves to secure the fact that the human self is constituted and 
governed by its relationship to God such that true human subjectivity — a central 
Kierkegaardian preoccupation — finds its decisive condition of possibility in the 
transcendent reality of God’s sovereign claim and mercy. Kierkegaard’s use of the 
coram deo motif reiterates the essential logic of Luther’s theological anthropology, 
sharpening the explication of human sinfulness and radicalizing the reality of divine 
grace as the sole possibility of genuine human selfhood. 
Introduction 
Approaches to Kierkegaard in contemporary theology vary widely. And among those 
who take Kierkegaard primarily to be an “expositor of Christian concepts,” there is 
specific debate concerning whether and just how he might stand in formative 
 Eberhard Jüngel, Justification: The Heart of the Christian Faith (London: T&T Clark, 2001), 1
xxxvi.
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relation to the traditions and trajectories of Lutheran theology.  It seems 2
incontrovertible that Kierkegaard’s searching reflections upon the conception of the 
human person as coram deo — i.e., before God — represents a deep investment in 
a distinctively Lutheran theological motif. This essay explores the place and function 
of the coram deo motif in the Dane’s theological programme seeking thereby to 
discern and account for its significance. Focusing on the text of Sickness Unto Death 
in particular, I will argue that the coram deo motif serves to secure the fact that the 
human self is at once constituted and governed by its relationship to God such that 
true human subjectivity — one of Kierkegaard’s central preoccupations — is shown 
to have as its decisive condition of possibility the transcendent reality of God’s 
sovereign claim and mercy. More than this, Kierkegaard’s use of the coram deo 
motif republishes key features of the essential logic of Luther’s theological 
anthropology, even as it sharpens the explication of human sinfulness and so also 
radicalizes the appreciation of divine grace as the sole possibility of genuine human 
selfhood. 
What is commonly referred to as Luther’s own “relational” anthropology has 
at its heart the claim that standing “before God” is fundamentally constitutive of 
human reality as such.  As Hans-Martin Barth observes, in light of his “experience 3
of transcendence in the encounter with the word” Luther “saw his life with an 
 See Lee C. Barrett, “Kierkegaard as Theologian: A History of Countervailing 2
Interpretations,” in The Oxford Handbook of Kierkegaard, ed. J. Lippitt and G. Pattison 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 541-543 and more extensively on Kierkegaard’s 
own relation to Luther also Ernest B. Koenker, “Søren Kierkegaard on Luther,” in Interpreters 
of Luther: Essays in Honor of Wilhelm Pauck, ed. J. Pelikan (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1968), 231-252, and Lee C. Barrett, “Kierkegaard’s Appropriation and Critique of Luther and 
Lutheranism,” in A Companion to Kierkegaard (Oxford: Blackwell, 2015), 180-192, 
especially in relation to the themes of justification and conscience, 182-185. Notably, 
discussion of the concept of coram deo itself does not feature in either Koenker’s or Barrett’s 
valuable accounts.
 For recent summary discussion of Luther’s anthropology, see Notiger Slenczka, “Luther’s 3
Anthropology,” in The Oxford Handbook to Martin Luther’s Theology, ed. R. Kolb, et al, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 212-232 and Oswald Bayer, Martin Luther’s 
Theology: A Contemporary Interpretation, trans. T. H. Trapp (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2008), 
154-176.
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immediacy that can scarcely be exaggerated as existence ‘before God,’ coram deo.”  4
That humans qua creatures “cannot subsist for a moment by their own strength” 
but rather rest entirely upon God’s creative sustaining is essential to this claim; but 
so too, and most distinctively, is the idea that human beings are constituted in and 
by their confrontation with the iustitia dei and so ultimately are per definitionem 
those tried by divine righteousness and justified by faith.  Indeed, the logic of 5
justification supplies, for Luther, the logic of creation as such, in as much as qua 
creature, “human existence is ‘justified through faith’ existence.”  As Gerhard 6
Ebeling emphasizes, the phrase coram deo announces that reality itself “is only 
understood for what it is if the word of God, through which it has its being and 
which is what is truly reality in it, is heard” because human reality is simply and 
fundamentally “existence in the sight of God, in the presence of God, under the 
eyes of God, in the judgement of God, and in the world of God.”   7
“Before God” is, of course, a spatial rather than temporal trope. Minimally, it 
carries the meaning “with reference to God.” But such rendering is far too formal to 
deliver adequately the force of Luther’s idea of the existence determining Word of 
God, i.e., of the divine address that effectively constitutes human reality. To be 
coram deo is to find oneself in a determinative and inescapable encounter with the 
God of the gospel mediated concretely by God’s word, which means via both law 
and gospel. As we shall see, Kierkegaard’s own talk of the human self “before God” 
is substantive in just this way, reiterating as it does the biblical idiom which speaks 
 Hans-Martin Barth, The Theology of Martin Luther: A Critical Assessment (Minneapolis: 4
Fortress Press, 2013), 491.
 The citation is drawn from Luther’s Bondage of the Will, Luther’s Works, vol. 33, ed. P. S. 5
Watson (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), 103.
 Bayer, Martin Luther’s Theology, 156. Famously, Luther offers this definition in thesis 32 of 6
his Disputatio de homine: “The human being is human in that s/he is justified by faith,” see 
“The Disputation on Man (1536),” in Luther’s Works, vol. 34, ed. L. W. Spitz (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1960), 137-40. See also William C. Weinrich, “Homo Theologicus: Aspects of 
a Lutheran Doctrine of Man,” in Personal Identity in Theological Perspective, ed. R. Links et 
al. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 29-44.
 Gerhard Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction to His Thought, trans. R. A. Wilson (London: 7
Collins, 1972), 198-99.
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of the human being set “before the countenance of the Lord.”  In unfolding this 8
case that Kierkegaard is here best understood with close reference to Luther, I am 
pushing in a quite different direction than other readings of this theme in Sickness 
unto Death. On the one hand, the reading I offer does not concern itself directly 
with the “social function” of the idea of coram deo which others have discerned.  On 9
the other, my reading also pulls away from those that restrict their interest either to 
the role of the idea in the outworking of Kierkegaard’s own poetic autobiography, or 
else consider “before God” a kind of rational “postulate,” i.e., a strictly formal and 
“regulative” concept whose meaning is purely “heuristic” and not at all “ostensive,” 
as Kant himself would put it.  For a dynamic, realist account of the concept of 10
coram deo allows us to understand the structure and content of Sickness unto 
Death as an elaboration of Kierkegaard’s core conviction, that: 
Paganism required: Know yourself. Christianity declares: No, that is 
provisional — know yourself — and then look at yourself in the mirror 
of the Word in order to know yourself properly. No true self-knowledge 
without God-knowledge or [without standing] before God. To stand 
before the mirror means to stand before God.  11
 The Vulgate makes use of the actual phrase coram deo regularly in this sense of “in the 8
sight of God,” not least in passages where judgments and solemn declarations of 
truthfulness are made, e.g., Gen 6:11; Ps 56:13; 2 Cor 2:17, 4:2, 7:13, 8:21, 12:19; Gal 
1:20; 1 Tim 5:4, 5:21; 2 Tim 4:1. Luther’s own usage (vor Gott) typically means decisively 
“in the sight of God” — see, e.g., Martin Luther, “The Bondage of the Will,” LW 33, 239-240; 
and in comments on Psalm 73:16 (LW 10, 418) and Psalm 95:2 (LW 11, 252). In Danish 
language Bibles, coram deo is typically rendered by the phrase “for Guds Ǻsyn.”
 Seung-Goo Lee, “A Social Function of Coram Deo in the Thought of Kierkegaard,” Journal 9
of Reformed Theology 1 (2007), 153-177, and in quite a different mode also John D. 
Caputo, “Hauntological Hermeneutics and the Interpretation of Christian Faith: On Being 
Dead Equal Before God,” in Hermeneutics at the Crossroads, ed. K. Vanhoozer 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006), 95-109.
 For the former, see Joackim Garff, Søren Kierkegaard: A Biography, trans. B. H. Kirmmse 10
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 542-45; for the latter, George Pattison, 
“‘Before God’ as a Regulative Concept,” in Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, ed. N. J. 
Cappelørn et al. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 70-84. The remark from Kant comes 
from the Critique of Pure Reason, ed. and trans. P. Guyer and A. W. Wood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 606. 
Søren Kierkegaard, Søren Kierkegaard’s Journal and Papers, ed, and trans. H. V. Hong and 11
E. H. Hong (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1967-78), vol. 4, 40 (X.4 A4120). 
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The Despairing Self “Transparent to its Ground” — The Sinful 
Self “Before God” 
The argument of Sickness unto Death unfolds in two parts. In the first, Kierkegaard 
sets out a wide-ranging discussion of the manifold ways in which human beings fail 
at — and so despair of — being “a self.” Famously, he defines the self in reflexive 
and agential terms, suggesting that a human being is established as a three-fold 
synthesizing of the finite, the infinite, and the relation between them. If all were as 
it should be, one would say that “in relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, 
the self rests transparently in the power that established it.”  As it is, the self 12
perpetuates, suffers, and so becomes a mis-relation, namely, “the misrelation in the 
relation of a synthesis that relates itself to itself.”  Such misrelating is despair. It 13
has as its dual condition of possibility, the constitution of the human self in its 
proper and “original state from the hand of God,” and the reality of the human self 
as spirit, i.e., as a free relating that can forfeit its proper and original state by 
choosing the possibility of relating to itself otherwise from the very moment it is 
“released from [God’s] hand, as it were.”  As Kierkegaard represents it, this “fall” 14
is ceaselessly enacted in the present precisely because it is constantly reproduced 
by the active mis-relating of the self to itself and its eternal ground. Never just sick, 
but always also self-sickening, the self spirals through all-manner of variations of 
despair: suspended in the dialectic of infinitude and finitude, possibility and 
necessity, the self enacts its constitutive freedom and consciousness in ways that 
consistently fail at its task and forfeit its destiny of “becoming itself.” The majority 
of section one of the work schematically analyses the many “forms of this sickness” 
with alarming acuity en route to the final, maximal, “demonic despair” of absolute 
nihilistic defiance in which a self “in hatred towards existence, it wills to be itself, 
wills to be itself in accordance with its misery.”  15
 Søren Kierkegaard, Sickness unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for 12
Upbuilding and Awakening, ed. and trans. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980), 14.
 SUD, 15.13
 SUD, 16.14
 SUD, 42, 73.15
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As the invocation of “God” in this brief discussion signals, even before the 
argument becomes explicitly hamartiological in section two, Kierkegaard’s 
anthropology is already theological in character. All despair is properly “despair of 
the eternal and over oneself.”  That a human being is in despairing mis-relation to 16
itself is something that can only be discerned with reference to the original and final 
reality of a proper relating won in and through relation to God.  In fact, 17
Kierkegaard avers here that the reality of the self cannot be conceived correctly in 
anything other than a theological register, as the concept of the human as spirit 
only really exists here. Below and outwith this register — i.e., without the self being 
“conscious of itself as spirit or conscious of itself before God as spirit” — all despair 
will be suffered in ignorance; indeed, Kierkegaard suggests this is the most 
prevalent form of despair in the world.  Never just the self, but the self and “the 18
God relationship” — indeed, the self in the God-relationship — is what is 
fundamentally at issue. This is made more patent when Kierkegaard declares that 
“the opposite to being in despair is to have faith”: the definition of faith is that of 
genuine selfhood, namely, that “in relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, 
the self rests transparently in the power that established it.”  This means that the 19
discussion of despair concerns the pathology of unbelief. In view of this, it would be 
difficult to sustain the view that Part One of Sickness Unto Death represents a pure 
and independent phenomenology of the despairing self; rather, it substantively 
anticipates the more extensively theological discussion which follows in Part Two.  20
Here we discern an evident parallel with Luther’s Disputatio de homine, where the 
Reformer asserts the severe limitations of the philosophical approach to the 
 SUD, 60.16
 SUD, 16, 30.17
 SUD, 46, 45.18
 SUD, 49.19
 For supple and detailed discussion of the interpretative issues involved, see Arne Grøn, 20
“The Relation Between Part One and Part Two of The Sickness unto Death,” in Kierkegaard 
Studies Yearbook, ed. N. J. Cappelørn et al. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 35-50.
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question of humanity on the basis that there is “no hope” that one “can himself 
know what he is until he sees himself in his origin which is God.”   21
This character of Kierkegaard’s anthropology becomes all the more robust in 
Part Two of the work with the explicit introduction of the decisive concept of coram 
deo in the definition of sin: 
Sin is: before God, or with the conception of God, in despair not to will 
to be oneself, or in despair to will to be oneself. Thus sin is intensified 
weakness or intensified defiance: sin is the intensification of despair. 
The emphasis is on before God, or with the conception of God; it is the 
conception of God that makes sin dialectically, and religiously what 
lawyers call “aggravated” despair.  22
As Dietrich Bonhoeffer suggested in his own 1930 inaugural lecture, 
The person who understands himself from the perspective of his 
possibilities understands himself within his own self-reflection. In 
revelation, however, the human being is torn out of this reflection and 
receives the answer to his question only from and before God [nur von 
und vor Gott]. Here we find the fundamental difference between 
philosophical and theological anthropology.   23
Kierkegaard’s concern in the second part of Sickness unto Death is precisely to 
display this very difference, as he undertakes an ever-more-explicitly theological 
anthropological reflection; indeed, he explicitly styles his new subject here the 
“theological self” which is simply, as he explains, “the self directly before God.”  I 24
suggest that in doing so he specifically echoes Luther’s own use of the parallel Latin 
 Luther, Disputatio de homine, thesis 17, cf. theses 11-18, LW 34, 137-38.21
 SUD, 77.22
 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Barcelona, Berlin, New York: 1928-1930. Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, 23
ed. C. J. Green, trans. D. W. Stott (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008), vol. 10, 403. Setting 
out the logic of this claim is the core ambition of Bonhoeffer’s early dissertation, Act and 
Being. 
 SUD, 79.24
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phrase “homo theologicus” in his 1536 disputatio de homine.  Further, like Luther, 25
for Kierkegaard the theological self is the human being understood firmly with 
reference to its career as created, fallen, and set under the divine promise of 
reconciliation and redemption. Theological anthropology organised by the concept 
of existence coram deo is not merely or primarily keyed to the doctrine of creation 
as such, but rather to the reality of sin, judgment and redemption, and so to 
soteriology. 
The phraseology of the opening remark of Part Two intimates close continuity 
with the preceding discussion of despair: talk of “intensification” and “aggravation” 
suggest that the effect of the introduction of the coram deo is to effect a 
quantitative adjustment. But Kierkegaard’s fuller exposition deploys concepts 
designed to express the qualitative difference at stake with the advent of God most 
fully into the discussion. The “theological self” is “no longer merely the human self” 
and the discussion must, now “dialectically take a new direction”  because the 26
introduction of the reality of the self coram deo amplifies the significance of the 
situation of the self “infinitely”  by placing it in the register of eternity ; this 27 28
qualification of human existence makes the self a matter of “extraordinary” 
importance.  To place the self before God is to eliminate at a stroke the importance 29
of every partial and measured assessment of human reality as “more or less” or “in 
part” in which nothing decisive is (or ought to be) taken too far.  Kierkegaard here 30
suggests that this natural, all-too-human — indeed “pagan” — style of moderate 
reasoning domesticates and so betrays the radicality of the human situation, a 
radicality that only dialectical theological reflection can honour. As in other 
Kierkegaard texts, the ideas of “paradox” and “offense” operate here to announce 
 Thesis 28 speaks of Aristotle as one “who knows nothing of theological man,” LW 34, 139. 25
The meaning of the “theological self” is spelt out explicitly in theses 20-23, 32, and 35.
 SUD, 79.26
 SUD, 80, 100.27
 SUD, 105.28
 SUD, 83, 86.29
 Kierkegaard refers to the golden mean — ne quid nimis — here as a shorthand for all of 30
this, Sickness unto Death, 86.
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the humiliation of reason before the reality of the Christian God whose coming 
profoundly qualifies our human reality in judgment and grace. As he puts it 
memorably: “Here Christianity steps in [and] makes the sign of the cross before 
speculation.”   31
This is all to acknowledge that the introduction of the coram deo into the 
discussion affects both the content but also decisively the form of reflection itself. 
Both the “what” and the “how” of our thinking and discourse are implicated in the 
situation of the despairing self coram deo, which is to say, in sin. This insight is 
concentrated in Kierkegaard’s claim that the advent of the concept of sin brings 
with it “the category of individuality” and of “the single individual.”  In fact, when 32
pressed, the idea of sin coram deo properly reduces to acknowledgement of the 
reality of the actual sinner: Sin “cannot be thought speculatively” because the 
reality of God and of human existence before God disallow such abstraction and 
instead demand “earnestness” from a discourse that “immerses itself in actuality.”  33
This pressure derives from the fact that, as Kierkegaard puts it, such “abstractions 
simply do not exist for God; for God in Christ there live only single individuals 
(sinners)... God does not avail himself of an abridgement.”  Although the coram 34
deo arrives late discursively and conceptually, its arrival — when taken seriously — 
presses the whole business of human self-reflection into the existential situation of 
a genuine confrontation with God: indeed, merely to think and talk about the 
human coram deo is not yet to have suffered and acknowledged the reality of 
actually having being placed coram deo.  
It is worth noting that Kierkegaard’s exposition of the self in sin coram deo 
also develops along the lines of the traditional Lutheran law and gospel pattern. In 
the first instance, the encounter with God takes the form of law in the sense that 
God comes to provide the “criterion”  that qualifies and “infinitely magnifies” the 35
 SUD, 120.31
 SUD, 119.32
 SUD, 119-20.33
 SUD, 121.34
 SUD, 79, 81, 114.35
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desperate human situation. In Ebeling’s concise phrasing: “The coram-relationship 
reveals that the fundamental situation of man is that of a person on trial.”  With 36
the image of the human “before God” Kierkegaard directly evokes the biblical 
picture of the person confronted with the holiness of God, placed before the divine 
judgment seat, or addressed by the divine commandment and claim. This is in 
keeping with the idea that it is exclusively in and through the encounter with God 
that the reality of sin is disclosed and known as such. In traditional Lutheran 
doctrine, it is the primary work of the law to aggravate and illumine sin, and so to 
drive the sinner to despair of his or her own efforts at putting life to rights. The 
exposure of the self coram deo is a compressed depiction of precisely this 
encounter with the law: “Christianity proceeds to establish sin so firmly as a 
position that the human understanding can never comprehend it.”   37
But the theological self is finally forged by both law and gospel. As 
Kierkegaard considers, the self is never only coram deo but always coram Christi, 
which means it is confronted with the reality of sin because confronted with the 
reality of forgiveness of sins.  Now Kierkegaard’s specific interest here is not in 38
elaboration of the evangelical promise. It is in expounding the modalities of human 
sin, including those ways in which sin despairs of the gospel itself, i.e., refuses to 
entrust itself to the “infinite love of [God’s] merciful grace” enacted in the 
incarnation  and so — in the language of the thesis of the work — refuses to “rest 39
transparently in the power that established it.” As Kierkegaard observes in the very 
last sentence of the work, this refusal is precisely the refusal of faith.  If the gospel 40
is received as gospel, “the person who does not take offence worships in faith.”  41
But what we have, in effect, is a reflection on how the word of the gospel can and 
does itself become “law,” as it were: confronted by the reality of God come low for 
us to save in Jesus Christ, the self can and does yet take offense and, despairing, 
 Ebeling, Luther, 197.36
 SUD, 100.37
 SUD, 113.38
 SUD, 126.39
 SUD, 131.40
 SUD, 129.41
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declines worship and refuses to believe. Precisely because here the encounter with 
God is concretized fully and finally in the paradox of the incarnation — because the 
sinner is before God in Christi — this represents for Kierkegaard “the highest 
intensification of sin.”   42
It is a matter of note that in all of this Sickness unto Death closely parallels 
the discussion of sin which features in the argument advanced earlier in 
Philosophical Fragments.  In that text, Kierkegaard had contrasted what might be 43
involved in coming to know the truth in the situation of ignorance — detailed in the 
text by reference to Socrates and the Platonic idea of knowing as recollection — 
with what would be involved in coming to know the truth in the situation of sin, i.e., 
where one exists in untruth. The learner in the latter case is one who exists in 
“polemical” contradiction of the truth and lacks the very condition of possibility for 
coming to truth; indeed, such a person cannot even form the question about the 
truth. Such a person, Kierkegaard says there, “has forfeited and is forfeiting the 
condition” for coming to the truth.  The one who is able to teach the truth in this 44
situation is no less than a saviour, i.e., the one whose coming sets one in a relation 
to the truth in which the truth itself affords the very conditions for its reception, and 
so, as Kierkegaard says, effectively delivers a person from “not existing” to 
“existing.”  In spinning out his account of the manifold refusal to “be a self” in 45
despair before God, Kierkegaard is expositing the subjectivity — and so inescapable 
existential self-involvement — that corresponds to this very scenario of decisive 
revelatory encounter of the divine with the human being in sin. In both texts, the 
human can and must be placed into the truth by the effective advent of God which 
places our despair into the truth and so renders it sin, even as it overreaches it in 
judgment and forgiveness. This is what Kierkegaard means when he asserts in 
Sickness unto Death that “sin is a position”: sin can only be acknowledged on the 
 SUD, 131.42
 Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, ed. and trans. H.V. Hong and E. H. Hong 43
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). 
 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, 14-15.44
 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, 22.45
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basis of “a revelation of God”  because the reality of being “before God is the 46
definitely positive element in it.”  This important claim, and more fully the close 47
interrelation of the arguments of these two different works — one concerned with 
the subjectivity of the human being before God and the other with the sheer 
historical positivity of the eternal moment of saving revelation — makes it difficult 
to accede the thought that “before God” is, as Pattison suggests, a strictly 
regulative concept with only the logical and discursive force of an “as if.” Instead, it 
displays the logic of a theology of the Word, in which the divine address effectively 
delivers its hearers into the truth of its own declaration and judgment (law) and 
grace (gospel). “That sin is a position,” Kierkegaard observes in this vein, “can be 
made clear from only one side,” namely from the side of the God before whom the 
human stands.  48
Conclusions 
Kierkegaard explores the idea of the human self in its despair in order to disclose 
that the human is a creature in revolt against itself and its God, in short, that the 
human being exists in sin. The presentation is highly schematic, offering as he says 
an “algebraic” definition of sin capable of expressing the essential logic of any and 
all its horrid actuations.  The concept of coram deo proves to be the decisive factor 49
in this algebra: it individuates, infinitely intensifies and qualifies human existence 
against its sole, ultimately relevant criterion, namely the absurd, offensive and 
paradoxical reality of the saving advent of God for us in Jesus Christ.  But finally, it 50
is in virtue of the reality of the gracious regard of God that the self may in faith rest 
— as Kierkegaard has it — transparently in God as its ground. In view of the reality 
of the incarnation of God in Christ, a truly human life — and so a Christian life of 
faith — is not beyond our reach. As Bonhoeffer once observed, Christian existence 
 SUD, 96.46
 SUD, 100.47
 SUD, 99.48
 SUD, 82.49
 SUD, 83.50
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simply means “that one both may and must live as a human being before God.”  51
He explains, 
Since it is unable to place itself into the truth, [the self] “is” only in the 
instance of God’s decision for it, which must also be understood, of 
course in some way as its decision for God. In other words, existence 
“is” in its “being in reference to God”... Only that existence which 
stands in the truth — that is that stands in the decision — understands 
itself and does so in such a way that it knows itself placed into the 
truth by Christ in judgment and in grace.  52
This existence “in reference to God” is precisely that “theological self” to which the 
reality and event of human existence coram deo gives rise in Kierkegaard’s 
account.  In all this, Kierkegaard has clearly discerned the significance of the core 53
Lutheran conviction that “in the coram Deo relationship we see ourselves as we 
really are — created, forgiven sinners because God sees us.”   54
Kierkegaard’s hamartiologically focused account of the reality of the 
theological self can teach a number of fundamental lessons that are readily 
forgotten or side-lined in much contemporary theological anthropology. Let me 
name but two.  
The first is the important place that the doctrine of sin has in the elaboration 
of any theological anthropology. Sylvia Walsh has persuasively argued that 
Kierkegaard lavishes attention upon the “negative qualifications” of the Christian 
life, including sin, precisely as a reflective and discursive strategy for making great 
 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethik, DBW 6, trans. I. Tödt, et al. (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 51
1992), 404, my translation.
 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Act and Being, in Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, ed. W. Whitson Floyd, 52
trans. H. M Rumscheidt (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), vol. 2, 96. The language of 
being “placed into the truth” of course suggests the influence of Kierkegaard’s own idiom in 
Philosophical Fragments.
 SUD, 79.53
 Mary E. Lowe, “Sin from a Queer Lutheran Perspective,” in Transformative Lutheran 54
Theologies: Feminist, Womanist, and Mujerista Perspectives, ed. M. J. Steufert 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 2010), 82.
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the full force of the divine claim and the radicality of divine grace.  Beyond this, as 55
Sickness unto Death itself makes patent, the reality of sin is self-obfuscating: 
intrinsic to the dynamic of sin is its capacity to render those trapped within it 
ignorant of their situation. Attending to this peculiar feature of hamartiology 
requires that theologians be recalled to acknowledge their own self-involvement in 
the reality of which they speak, and all the more, that they admit the permeability 
of the boundary between theological reflection and kerygmatic witness. 
Concentration upon the question of sin in theological anthropology beneficially 
reminds theology of its place firmly within that soteriological setting which the word 
of God bespeaks and indeed establishes as the context of all Christian theological 
reflection. 
The second lesson concerns the cardinal place of faith in the constitution of 
true human reality. Especially in a time marked by strong interest in the recovery 
and reassertion of the concept of virtue in the elaboration of theological 
anthropology and ethics, Kierkegaard here reiterates in his own distinctive way the 
essential Protestant claim that to be a truly human being is to be justified by faith. 
As he says, himself: 
Very often, however, it is overlooked that the opposite of sin is by no 
means virtue. In part, this is a pagan view, which is satisfied with a 
merely human criterion and simply does not know what sin is, that all 
sin is before God. No, the opposite of sin is faith, as it says in Romans 
14:23: “whatever does not proceed from faith is sin.” And this is one 
of the most decisive definitions for all Christianity — that the opposite 
of sin is not virtue but faith.   56
While Kierkegaard himself has much to say about the crucial role of discipleship, the 
imitation of Christ as an exemplar, and the centrality and rigorous practice of the 
“works of love” within the Christian life, these emphases are misunderstood when 
taken up as a straightforward insistence upon the life of virtue or as a derogation of 
faith as the hallmark of Christian existence. It is true that Kierkegaard contends 
 Sylvia Walsh, Living Christianly: Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Christian Existence (University 55
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that great “confusion has entered the sphere of religion since the time when ‘thou 
shalt’ was abolished as the sole regulative aspect of man’s relationship with God,” 
but he immediately suggests that the most fundamental divine imperative is in fact 
“thou shalt believe.”  Faith names that posture of receptivity and utter dependence 57
which marks a human life that relates itself to the truth of God truly. As he puts it 
sharply in his notebooks, a Christian life is one determined by “infinite humiliation 
and grace, and then a striving born of gratitude.”  The properly theological self is 58
thus constituted first and foremost by suffering this “infinite humiliation” before the 
judgment of God, and the reality of “grace” before the gospel of God: trust in the 
saving power of this encounter affords that gratitude from which all Christian 
witness, service, and moral striving arise and by which they are sustained. Or, as he 
says programmatically here, “the antithesis of sin/faith is the Christian one that 
Christianly reshapes all ethical concepts.”  In this, again, we have a clear echo of 59
Luther’s own account of the relation of faith and works set out programmatically in 
The Freedom of a Christian (1520) and elsewhere.  60
Overall, it seems that there is a good deal of interpretative traction to be 
gained when Sickness unto Death is read as a kind of a kaleidoscopic conceptual 
elaboration of sinful human existence under divine judgment and grace which 
accords with the anthropological claims advanced in Luther’s disputatio de homine. 
Here, as elsewhere, Kierkegaard’s extraordinary examinations of Christian 
subjectivity rest, if not on the “robustly metaphysical and ontological version of 
faith put forward by the Neo-Thomists,” then certainly upon a robustly relational 
and realist version of the same Christian faith as advanced by Luther.  61
Kierkegaard’s theological account of the human person coram deo displays the 
contours of a dynamic Reformation view of human existence — indeed, of the 
theological self — which moves from the fundamental acknowledgement that, as 
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Karl Barth put it, “What I am, I am in relation to God,” because, in view of the 
gospel “human ontology is not a settled condition, a ‘nature’ of any kind, but a 
response to the imposing presence of God, who summons me to live beyond 
myself.”  In short, in and through all its despairing reflexivity, the justifying truth 62
of the self is finally a function of God’s saving regard with faith as its fitting human 
corollary. In Luther’s idiom, to be justified by faith is what makes a human being 
human. In Kierkegaard’s own idiom, the primary anthropological claim is just this: 
“according to your faith, be it unto you, or, as you believe, so you are, to believe is 
to be.”  63
 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Ephesians, ed. R. D. Nelson and trans. R. M. Wright (Grand 62
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2017), 89. The last remark comes from Christopher Asprey, 
Eschatological Presence in Karl Barth’s Göttingen Dogmatics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 24.
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